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In his well—known analysis of the national debt, Robert Barro
introduced the notion of a "dynastic family." This notion has since
become a standard research tool, particularly in the areas of public
finance and macroeconomics. In this paper, we critique the assumptions
uponwhichthe dynastic model is predicated, and argue that this
framework is not a suitable abstraction In contexts where the objective
is to analyze the effects of public policies. We reach this conclusion
by formally considering a world in which each generation consists of a
largenumber of distinct individuals, as opposed to one representative
individual. We point out thatfamilylinkages form complex networks, in
which each individual maybelongto manydynasticgroupings.The
resulting proliferation of linkages betweenfamilies gives rise to a
host of neutrality results, including the irrelevance of all public
redistributions, distortionary taxes, and prices. Since these results
are not at all descriptive of the real world, we conclude that, in some
fundamental sense,theworldis not even approximately dynastic. These
observations call into question all policy related results based on the
dynasticframework, including the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis.
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Over the last decade, there has been a growing awareness that many
important public policy issues turn critically upon the assumed nature
of economic relationships within the family. This awareness is largely
attributable to seminal papers by Robert Barro [1974] and Gary Becker
[1974]. Barro's paper ostensibly concerns the national debt, but its
implications are much more far-reaching. Specifically, Barro
supplemented the traditional overlapping generations model with
intergenerational altriusm, and argued, in essence, that voluntary
transfers between parents and children cause the representative
"dynastic" family to behave as though it is a single, infinite—lived
individual. Policies which fail to affect the family's real
opportunities are neutralized through private actions; thus, Ricardian
equivalence and related propositions (concerning the irrelevance of
government debt and Social Security) follow directly. The dynastic
family model has since become a standard research tool, particularly in
the areas of public finance and macroeconomics (see, for example, Abel
[1984], Chamley [1981], and Judd [1965]). No doubt, its popularity in
part reflects considerations of analytic convenience.!7
In this paper, we critique the dynastic family as a modelling
tool, and argue that it is not a suitable abstraction in contexts where
the objective is to analyze the effects of various public policies. Our
criticism differs fundamentally from those offered by previous
commentators (see e.g., Feldstein [1976], Buchanan [1976], and Tobin and
Buiter [1980]), in that we assail neither the logic, nor the assumptions—2—
employed by studies which invoke the dynastic framework. Rather, we
take these at face value, and show that the lead to untenable
conclusions.
We reach these conclusions by formally considering a world in
which each generation consists of a large number of distinct
individuals, as opposed to one representative individual. While the
notion of a representative consumer is always somewhat objectionable,
here it is especially pernicious, in that it obscures considerations
arising from the biological structure of families. For the human
species, propogation requires the participation of two traditionally
unrelated individuals. Thus, family linkages form complex networks, in
which each individual may belong to many dynastic groupings. In this
paper, we argue that the resulting proliferation of linkages between
families gives rise to incomparably stronger neutrality properties under
weaker conditions than those imposed by Barro. In particular, no
government transfer (including those between unrelated members of the
same generation) has any real effect, and all tax instruments (including
so—called "distortionary" taxes) are equivalent to lump—sum taxes. In
essense, the government can effect the allocation of real resources only
by altering real expenditures. The efficiency role of government is
thus severely limited, and the distributional role is entirely
eliminated. More generally, we argue that if all linkages between
parents and children are truly operative, then market prices play no
role in the resource allocation process--the distribution of all goods
is determined by the nature of intergenerational altruism.—3—
If taken literally, these results would have profound implications
for the study of economics. We hardly intend to suggest that such
extreme conclusions are warranted. Rather, when results stretch the
bounds of credibility past the breaking point, it is natural to question
the validity of underlying assumptions. We must therefore emphasize
that we have obtained these results under relatively weak conditions,
and that these same conditions are the fundamental building blocks of
the dynastic model. Thus, refusal to accept the practical implications
of our results is tantamount to a rejection of the dynastic framework,
and calls into serious question the results (such as Ricardian
equivalence) which follow from it.
In particular, we assume: (1) parents are operatively linked
through transfers (gifts and bequests) with their children (although we
do not specify the direction of these transfers), and (2) levels of
gifts and bequests do not matter pse (consumers care only about the
consequences of giving, and not the act of giving). If we are unwilling
to accept the extreme implications described above, we must abandon one
of these assumptions. Further analyses of economic policies, such as
the effects of government debt, require us to specify quite explicitly
which of these assumptions fails, and how it fails.
The paper is organized as follows. Initially, we assume the
existence of pervasive linkages, and analyze their effects. In
Section 2, we consider some simple examples which illustrate the
principles driving our neutrality theorems. Analysis of our general
model appears in Section 3. In Section 4, we argue that operative-4—
transfers between parents and their children are alone sufficient to
establish pervasive linkages throughout the population. In Section 5,
we clarify the nature of our results, reexamine the central assumptions,
and consider various interpretations.
2. Examples
The linear structure of "dynastic" families in Barro [1974] allows
him to model a family as, essentially, a single, infinite—lived consumer
with dynamically consistent preferences. In particular, he specifies
the well—being of generation t as a function of t's own consumption,
and the utility of t's immediate successor:
ut(ct,ut+i)
Popular intuitive explanations of Ricardian equivalence are closely tied
to this formulation: since the dynastic family chooses an optimal
program, it will simply offset any exogenous, intertemporal redistribu—
tions of resources which might displace it from the optimum.V
Once one recognizes the complex biological structure of families,
this linearity disappears (for example, unrelated individuals share
common descendents). Due to the existence of linkages between families,
it is, in general, impossible to represent any particular family (or set
of families) as a single, utility—maximizing agent, even when the well-
being of each individual is assumed to depend only on his own
consumption and the well—being of his children, asabove.-"—5—
This observation raises an important question: does Barro's
version of Ricardian equivalence depend upon the assumption that we can
represent each family as a single infinite-lived consumer, or upon the
more basic assumption that family members are linked through operative
transfers? Our analysis demonstrates that the first of these
assumptions is, in fact, unnecessary; however, this observation leads us
to conclude that voluntary transfers through operative linkages are,
under very weak assumptions, capable of neutralizing the effects of all
tax and transfer policies (including so—called "distortionary" policies
which are conditioned on behavior). Given the proliferation of linkages
between families, the implications of these observations are profound.
We defer our analysis of interfamily linkages to Section 4, and
our discussion of larger implications to Section 5.Inthis and the
following section, we simply assume that a number of individuals are
linked through operative transfers., and explore the role of transfers in
offsetting government policies. We begin with two simple examples.
Example 1: Suppose there are three individuals, 1, 2, and 3.
Individuals 1and 2 have quasiconcave preferences of the form
u.(c.,c3)
,I=1,2
while 3's preferences are simply u3(c3). We may think of 3asa
common descendent of 1and 2, who are unrelated. Each consumer i
is endowed with wealth w. 1and 2 divide this wealth between own
1





There are, of course, a variety of ways in which 1and 2 might
determine the magnitude of their transfers to 3. For the purpose of
this illustration, we will assume that the exogenous environment is such
that 1and 2 must make simultaneous, non—cooperative choices.
Accordingly, it is perhaps most natural to consider Nash equilibria in
transfers to 3. Suppose that there exists a Nash equilibrium in which 1
and 2 both make positive transfers. The reader may easily verify
through a direct argument that private transfers will then neutralize
the effects of all sufficiently small lump sum redistributional
poiicies4/ despite the fact that this extended family does not act as a
single, utility maximizingindividual.-' Throughout this paper, we use a
more powerful but less direct line of argument, which works as follows.
We have described an environment in which two agents, 1 and 2,
play a simple game. Each agent chooses an action (transfer) b.
subject to the constraint b. > 0, and receives a payoff of
u.(w. -b.,w +b.+b.) 1 1 1 3 1
By transferring z from 1to 2, the government alters this gameas
follows. Each agent still chooses an action b subject to the



















—z.That is, we think of agent 1 (2) as choosing




Notethat this differs from the original game in only two respects.
First, the same abstract action has a different practical interpretation
in each case. For example, we associate the choice "b1 =5"with the
interpretive label "1transfers $5 to 3," while we associate
=5"with the label "1transfers $5 —zto 3." Since all
standard solution concepts have the property that strategically
equiva1ent/ games give rise to equivalent sets of equilibria, changing
the interpretations of abstract actions is inconseq.uentiaiJi Second,
agents' opportunity sets differ between the two games. Since this
difference is potentially substantive, we conclude that private actions
neutralize the effects of.governxuent transfer policies as long as the
original equilibrium is insensitive to perturbations in the agents'
constraints.
This simple condition is, in principle, easily verifiable.
Suppose, for example, that we have an initial Nash equilibrium with
b. > 0 ,i=1,2.Under the assumption that utility is q.uasiconcave,
equilibrium behavior is insensitive to small perturbations of the
constraints, so neutrality follows as an immediate corollary. However,
it should now also be clear that quasiconcavity does not play a
significant role in establishing this result. As long as u1 is-8-
continuous and i strictly prefers b.to 0, the basic robustness
condition is satisfied. Since indifference between b. and 0 is an 1
extremelyunlikely outcome (formally, one can show that it is a measure
zero event in the space of potential preferences), the existence of an
equilibrium with positive transfers is generally sufficient to guarantee
that private actions will neutralize sufficiently small government
transfer policies.
This alternative line of reasoning also allows us to conclude that
neutrality will hold for a wide range of solution concepts. When an
environment gives rise to a multiplicity of Nash equilibria, one often
hopes to identify a unique outcome, or at least narrow down the set of
possible outcomes, by employing some refinement of the Nash concept. As
long as an interior Nash equilibrium strictly satisfies (violates)
certain refined criteria, small perturbations of the corner constraints
will not generally cause it to violate (satisfy) these criteria../
More generally, it is natural to expect that interior equilibria
will typically satisfy the basic condition unless the corner constraints
play a special role in defining the relevant solution concept. Suppose
for example that x and y can form binding contracts, so that
transfers are determined through bargaining. If the relevant threat
point is b1 =b2
=0,then the Nash bargaining solution will not give
rise to neutralizing behavior. However, if a breakdown in negotiations
is followed by non—cooperative behavior (so that a non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium prevails), and if this threat point entails positive
transfers, then the basic condition will generally hold, and private—9-
actionswill neutralize small transfer policies.
While it would be interesting to identify more primitive exogenous
conditions under which transfers are positive and equilibria are robust
with respect to perturbations of corner constraints, this is not our
current objective. As we argue in the next section, the most important
aspects of dynastic behavior arise only when these hypotheses are
satisfied. Since our objective is to critique the dynastic model by
taking its central premises (which concern the endogenous properties of
equilibria) at face value, it is appropriate to restrict our attention
accordingly.
Example 2: Suppose everything is as in example 1, except that
individual 1chooses labor supply ()priorto the choices of
consumption andtransfers.Further assume that his utility is given by
u1(c1,c3,1)
,
andthat his wealth is
w1=w+w1—z(Z1)
where w is non—labor income, w is the wage rate, and z is a tax
schedule, used for redistributing wealth from 1to 2. Thus, 2's
wealth is
w2 =w+z(1)-10-
The extensive form of this game is represented schematically in
Figure 1(a). First, 1chooses his labor supply; then, 1and 2 play
a simultaneous move "transfer game," as in example 1. Thus, if 1
chooses labor supply ,1and 2 play a transfer game in which their
endowments are w + — z(2.),and w +z(9),respectively (this
game is denote "G1"). Similarly, if 1chooses labor supply
1and 2 play the corresponding transfer game, G2.
Suppose that the government contemplates an arbitrary change in
the tax-transfer schedule from z to z'. At first, this may appear to
alter the game in a fundamental way. For instance, when 1chooses
this induces a simultaneous move transfer game between 1and 2,
where endowments are now w +wi
—z'(),and w +
respectively(this game is denoted in Figure 1(b)). Yet the total
resources of 1and 2 are identical in and G. Thus, by the
argument given in example 1, if we appropriately perturb the corner
constraints in G1, we obtain a game that is strategically equivalent to
•Clearly, this same reasoning applies regardless of1 's labor
supply decision (for instance, an appropriate perturbation in the corner
constraints of G2 yields a game that is strategically equivalent to
G). Consequently, the only substantive difference between these two
environments consists of perturbations in corner constraints. If the
original equilibria (or set of equilibria) is robust with respect to
such perturbations, then private actions will offset sufficiently small
policy changes.—11 —
'4
Again,we would like to identify circumstances underwhichthis
robustness condition is likely- to hold. For purposes of illustration,
we consider subgame perfect Nash equilibria (see Selten [1965, 1975]).
This solution concept demands that agents act in their own best
interests at all times, and serves to rule out threats which are not
credible, in the sense that agents would not be willing to carry them
out. Formally, a Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect if strategies form
Nash equilibria in every proper subgaine. In the current context, this
implies that every choice of Li must be followed by Nash behavior in
the ensuing simultaneous more transfer game. Our discussion in
example 1 establishes that, as long as the initial equilibrium entails
positive transfers in some particular subgame, perturbations of the
corner constraints will not generally alter behavior in that subgame.
If this condition holds for every subgame, then the original set of
perfect equilibria will indeed be robust with respect to arbitrary
perturbations of the corner constraints.
The assumption that transfers are positive for every choice of
is, of course, quite strong. However, the basic result typically
holds as long as transfers are positive following any choice in some
neighborhood of the original equilibrium selection, Li. By the
preceding argument, policy changes will not alter the consequences of
1 'a choices in this neighborhood——hence, remains a local optimum.
Furthermore, if 1strictly prefers L. to alternatives outside of
this neighborhood, and if equilibrium outcomes following such
alternatives vary continuously with the values of corner constraints,—12—
then Li remains a global optimumforsufficiently small
perturbations. This last condition (continuity) is relatively weak,
and, for example, follows from quasiconcavity of u1.
It is interesting to contrast these results with those that follow
from use of the unrefined Nash concept. There is typically a continuum
of Nash equilibria for the game described here, which we construct as
follows. If 1selects some L, 1and 2 play Nash choices in the
ensuing subganie. For any other choice of Li, 2 subsequently plays
=0(l's choices in these subgames are irrelevant). Effectively,
2 induces 1to choose L by threatening to hurt 3 unless 1
complies.V Clearly, 2's ability to punish 1though 3 determines the
set of labor supply choices which are sustainable in some equilibrium.
Any transfer from 1to 2 strengthens this ability, and therefore
expands the range of potential outcomes. There is then no guarantee
that private actions neutralize redistributional policies; indeed, if
2 can select a threat, redistributions ordinarily have real effects.
It is, however, important to reiterate that in such circumstances, the
central properties of dynastic behavior are also lost (see Section 3B).
The irrelevance of an apparently distortionary tax may, at first,
seem counterintuitive——indeed, readers who are unfamiliar with abstract
game theoretic arguments may wish to verify this result directly through
standard comparative statics.!2! The imposition of a tax schedule
certainly appears to change the relative price of 1 's leisure; should
this not effect his decision? The fundamental insight here is that the
price of l's leisure is not simply w, since he must also consider the—13—
effect of his labor—leisure choice on 2's transfer to 3. Thus, he
faces some "shadow" wage, and it is this shadow wage which is invariant
with respect to tax policy.
This invariance is easiest to understand in a single consumer
world. As long as the government must balance its budget, no tax can
distort behavior, since the individual knows that all revenues must be
returned to him at some point. By way of contrast, in a representative
consumer world each consumer is thought of as small relative to the
economy, so that the fraction of marginal revenues distributed to any
one consumer is negligible, and (in the absence of altruistic linkages)
can be ignored. The point of our analysis is that, as long as consumers
are linked through operative transfers, all marginal revenues associated
with the taxation of a particular individual are, regardless of
population size, eventually returned to that same individual, just as in
a single consumer world.
Once we have established that private actions offset the effects
of apparently distortionary taxes, it appears to follow immediately that
prices must be locally indeterminant, and that sufficiently small
changes in prices will have no effect on the allocation of real
resources. For suppose that 1and 2 are engaged in a market
transaction; one might, for example, generalize our simple model by
specifying that 2 is1 's employer. Decreasing the price at which
2 buys labor from 1seems analytically equivalent to imposing a
linear tax on l's earnings, and distributing the proceeds to 2.
While this intuition is essentially correct, its formalization raises—14—
some subtle issues which we address in Section 3D.
3. GeneralAnalysis
In the current section, we extend the analysis of Section 2 to
more general contexts. Part A exhibits an overlapping generations model
with intergenerational altruism. Part B concerns the technical defini-
tion of operative links. We present the generalized neutrality results
in part C, and discuss extensions in part D.
A. The Model
We consider a discrete time, (t =1,2,...)infinite horizon
overlapping generations model. For simplicity, we assume that there is
one composite good, which can either be consumed or invested. Current
output is determined through a constant returns-to—scale production
technology, as a function of current labor inputs and investment from
the previous period. Markets are perfectly competitive; firms earn zero
profits, and pay factor inputs their marginal products. Labor and
capital are each hoinogenous, so that in period t all labor receives a
wage rate of w, and capital yields a gross return of a ,paidin





Let I be the set of individuals born in period t. We suppose
that every individual lives for M+1 periods. Thus, I, the set of




We will use Nt and Nt to denote the number of individuals in
and 1,respectively.
t t At time t, each individual icIchooses consumption (c.),
labor supply (a),transfersto other living individuals
(b., j c i_{i}),-iJ_1 purchases of physicalcapital (s), and purchases of
short term (single period) bonds (d.). Since our model abstracts from
uncertainty, we will assume that bonds pay the competitive rate of
return, a.
Throughout our analysis, we employ the following notation. Let
t ., b. denote the vector of 1S transfersin period t:
(by.). iij jI—{i}
We will use Bt to indicate the sequence of all transfer choicesup to
period t—1:
Dt = ft1\ —
1,...,L?.j•t—i id id
(similarly for C, Lt, S, and Dt). We define a t—history of the
economy as a complete record of all choices made through the end of
period t—1
Ht =(Ct,Lt,Bt, S, Dt)
The governmentparticipates in this economy by financing a stream
ofreal expendituresthrough tax leviesandbond sales. Throughout, we—16—
assume that the stream of real expenditues, t> 1) is fixed, and
focus on the effects of alternative financial policies. We allow the
government to specify period t taxes on individual i as an arbitrary
function, z(Ht), of the observed t_history.-i./ Note that this very
general specification subsumes taxes on labor income, capital income,
and transfers. It also allows for idiosyncratic provisions, such as
income averaging. The government may also condition one individual's
taxes on another's actions. In 8hort, virtually any action may be
taxed, and the corresponding rate schedule may be chosen without
restriction.
Given a tax policy and real expenditure stream, the government
balances its budget by issuing debt. Specifically, the supply of




Forarbitrary taxes and expenditures, the implied deficit profile may,
of course, be infeasible (i.e., debt might eventually exceed economic
resources). We implicitly exclude such policies from consideration.
Prevailing prices and government financial policy determine the
opportunity constraint of each consumer. Specifically, for each
t
ici,
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Two comments are in order. First, we do not impose any
constraints on i's purchases of bonds. In particular, it is possible
to have d < 0, which signifies that i borrows at the competiive
rate, a. Thus, we have implicitly assumed that capital markets are
perfect. It is straightforward to relax this assumption by artificially
limiting borrowing; as long as liquidity constraints are generally non-
binding, our central results continue to hold. Since the absence of
binding liquidity constraints is fundamental to the dynastic
formulation, it is appropriate for us to focus our attention on this
case.
Second, we allow the lower bounds on i's period t
t t
transfers, b..(H ),todepend upon the evolution of prior decisions,
Ht. Ordinarily, we would expect these lower bounds to be invariant with
respect to Ht (generally, they equal zero). The more general
formulation adopted here allows us to contemplate a wider class of
perturbations to the corner constraints, and, correspondingly, a wider
class of alternative financial policies.
We complete the model by assuming that it is possible to represent
the preferences of each consumer i by a utility function defined over-18-
choices of consumption and labor:
u.(C,L)
Since we allow for dependence on the entire history of choices, this
specification is extremely general. By imposing additional
restrictions, one can obtain various formulations employed by other
authors, such as Barro's [1974] dynastic specification. Note also that
we do not require the utility of each individual to vary with the
choices of all other individuals; indeed, u would ordinarily be
insensitive to changes in most of its potential arguments. We do,
however, explicitly rule out direct dependence of preferences on the
levels of transfers. This restriction is, of course, essential.
As in the preceding section, our central result will depend upon a
hypothesis about the sensitivity of equilibria to perturbations in the
corner constraint. Since we generally expect interior equilibria to
satisfy this hypothesis under a wide range of solution concepts, and
since the hypothesis is in principle verifiable in any particular
context, we wish to avoid tying our analysis directly to a particular
notion of equilibrium. Thus, we will describe behavior within this
economy in as general terms as possible. We assume that consumers take
the wage rates and interest rates as fixed. A given profile of factor
prices induces a game, where in each period t, consumers choose
consumptions, labor supplies, transfers, purchases of capital, and
purchases of bonds. Each distinct t—historyRt identifies a distinct
subgame originating in period t. Players may condition their period—19—
tchoices upon the actual t-history which has resulted from previous
play. Thus, strategies consist of functions mapping t—histories to
current choices.
Individuals are, of course, constrained to select strategies which
satisfy their opportunity constraints in each period t for all feasible
t—histories and concurrent choices made by their contemporaries. This
requirement is more demanding than it might at first appear. In
particular, individual i cannot simply specify
(b. .) , a.,andd. as functions of Hsubject to budget
13jc]—(i}
1 1
balance,since concurrent deviations by contemporaries (e.g., a change
of b. for some j)mightrender these choices infeasible. Rather, he
must allow one of these variables to be determined as a residual. As
long as we confine our attention to pure strategy equilibria, i has no
basis for preferring one residual variable to another (he always assumes
that other players will select their equilbrium choices). For the
purposes of our analysis, it is convenient to assume that consumption is
always the residual variable. While selecting some other variable might
well alter the specific set of equilibrium outcomes (since this changes
the consequences of deviating from equilibrium actions for the deviating
player), it would not affect our central arguments.
For any particular solution concept, there is a (potentially
empty)set ofequilibria among consumers for the game induced by each
profileofpossible factor prices. We will say that a particular price
profileis a full equilibrium ifthere exists an equilibrium among
consumersrelative to these prices such that along the equilibrium path,-20-
(i) consumers demand in aggregate the amount of bonds supplied by the
government, and (ii) the aggregte demand for capital (labor) equals the
aggregate supply of capital (labor). Condition (ii) holds as long as
full employment of factor supplies generates marginal products equal to
the assumed factors prices.
B. Operative Linkages
Barro's [1974] formulation of the dynastic family employs both a
restrictive specification of preferences and a restrictive notion of
equilibrium (see footnote 1). In addition, he assumes that successive
generations are operatively linked, in the sense that parents make
positive, discretionary transfers to their children. Within his
framework, this condition is sufficient to guarantee that equilibrium
behavior is insensitive to perturbations in the lower bounds which
constrain specific transfer decisions. We have already remarked that
this implication does not necessarily hold in other more general
contexts. Indeed, for all but the simplest models (such as our
examples), it is extremely difficult to derive exogenous conditions
which guarantee the irrelevance of perturbing apparently non-binding
transfer constraints.
One might initially suspect that, as in Section 2, the desired
implication would follow directly from appropriate convexity
conditions. Unfortunately, when the preferences of successive
generations conflict, convexity of an individual's decision problem
depends not only upon the characteristics of utility functions and
budget constraints, but also upon the properties of equilibrium—21 —
strategies.In general, it is extremely difficult to guarantee that
these strategies are well-behaved.ii Furthermore, in various kinds of
non—cooperative equilibria, one individual may condition his transfer
upon another's behavior in order to exert influence. If the first
individual can credibly threaten to sever financial ties, then the
location of his corner constraint will affect behavior even if one
observes positive discretionary transfers in equilibrium (Bernheim,
Shleifer, and Summers [1985] develop this line of argument in greater
detail). Once again, it is very difficult to rule out this possibility
by imposing restrictions either on the exogenous environment or on the
notion of equilibrium.
Rather than search for a set of exogenous conditions which would
guarantee the irrelevance of apparently non—binding corner constraints,
our strategy is to assume directly that perturbations of certain
constraints have no effect on equilibrium behavior. Formally, we
proceed as follows. A potential link is a triplet, (i,j,t) ,suchthat
1 j,and i,j c I (since i and jareboth alive in period t,
it is conceivable that i could transfer resources to j at that
time). Let A be the set of all potential links. Consider some X C A,
and choose some vector of real numbers £ =(e..) .Thevector
ij (i,j,t)cX
of functions (.) isan c—perturbation of the original
—i (i,j,t)cX
constraints (￿jj(i,j,t)cX if for all (i,j,t) e X and Ht,
I.(Ht)I <e.
—i3 i,J
Subsequentto some perturbation, the constraints become—22—
b. > b.(Ht) +t(Ht)
13= —13 —13
forall Fitand(i,j,t) c X .Wewill say that XC A is a set of
jointly operative links if there exists some c > 0suchthat no
E—perturbation of (b.) alters the set of equilibria in the —(1,3,t)EX
gameinduced by the prevailing profile of factor prices.
In the following section, we assumethatparticular links are
jointly operative. Unfortunately, this assumption concernsthe
endogenous properties of equilbrium; its validity is therefore highly
dependent both upon the environment considered, and uponthe notion of
equilbrium employed. Certainly, assumptions of this kind are less
satisfactory from a theoretical point of view than those that concern
exogenous characteristics of the model. However,the reader should
recall that, in formulating the dynastic model, Barro [1974] assumes
that transfers are positive; this too concerns a property of
equilibrium. Since our objective is to critique the dynastic family as
an analytic tool by taking its basic premises at face value, the only
relevant question is whether we have assumed more than Barro.
We have already remarked that Barro's assumption is equivalent to
ours within the context of his model. More generally, the important
features of dynastic behavior do not necessarily follow from the
assumption that transfers are positive, unless our stronger assumption
(the irrelevance of perturbing corner constraints) is also satisfied.
One must therefore invoke this assumption (or more primitive conditions—23—
whichguarantee it) when generalizing the dynastic model to more complex
environments.
We demonstrate this principle in a model which is only slightly
more general than Barro's. Assume that Nt == 1,individuals desire
consumption only in the second period of life, labor supply is fixed,
and = 0.This is essentially Barro's model, except that we
allow for arbitrary forms of altruism. Our strategy is to impose
dynasticism by assuming that X {(t,t+i ,t)It > 1 1isa set of
jointly operative links, rather than by employing the weaker assumption
that bt+i > 0 for all t. As we now show, failure of our assumption
implies that one can always devise an arbitrarily small deficit policy
that has real effects, even if transfers are positive in every period.
Thus, one cannot establish Ricardian equivalence without employing our
formulation of the operative transfer condition.
Assume- that initially the government neither levies taxes nor
issues debt. A particular profile of factor prices induces a game in
t which each successive generation chooses bt subjectto the
constraint bt+i > 0. Consumption evolves according to the equation




Suppose that the operative transfer condition is not satisfied.
Then for any =(c1,c2,...)> 0 there exists an s—perturbation,
of the transfer constraints such that this perturbation
alters equilibrium behavior. For expositional simplicity, suppose that
one can always find such a perturbation where each .,t+1 is invariant-24—
with respect to Ht. Subsequent to this perturbation, a particular
profile of factor prices induces a game in which each successive
generation chooses bt÷i subject to the constraint bt+i
and where consumption evolves as before. By assumption, this game gives
rise to different behavior than does our original game.
Now we consider the following fiscal policy. The government
levies taxes as follows:
1_ t
zi —t,t+i
t_ t t—1 — —
Inaddition, it balances its budget constraint year by year through
issuing debt:
t_ t d
Suppose that this policy is neutral, i.e., that its implementation
does not alter capital accumulation or associated factor prices. The
original factor prices induce a game in which each successive generation
chooses bt+i subject to the original non—negativity constraint, and
in which consumption evolves as follows:
t t t—1 t c =w —z +a b -b
t t t t—1 t—1 ,t t,t+1




Subsequent to implementation of the policy, we may think of consumers as
choosing subject to the constraint that
Consumption evolves as follows:
t t t—1 t—1 t t
c w—z+a (— )—(p — ) t t t t—1t—1 ,t —t—1 ,t t,t+1 —t,t+1
t t—1 t =w
+,-
Thus,the same numerical choices are feasible, and lead to the same
consumption streams in the games induced by perturbing either the corner
constraints or the policy. Since these two games are strategically
equivalent, their equilibria must be identical. But then by hypothesis
the policy perturbation must have a real effect on consumption. Since
this alters aggregate capital accumulation and associated factor prices,
we have a contradiction.
Of course, failure of the operative transfer condition does not
guarantee that we can find an arbitrarily small perturbation of the
corner constraints, , thatboth alters equilibrium behavior
and has the property that each is invariant with respect to
Ht, as assumed above. However, this assumption seems relatively mild.
Recall that each distinct t—history Ht determines a different
subgame. Ordinarily, perturbations fail to affect behavior because they
do not change the outcome in any relevant subgame. Since each subgame
has an independent existence, one should then be able to perturb the
constraints differntly in different subgames, without effect (the reader
may wish to refer back to example 2 for an illustration). Thus, when—26—
all sufficiently small perturbances satisfying the invariance condition
fail to affect behavior, it is natural to expect that the operative
transfer condition will generally hold. Even when this reasoning is
invalid, one can show through a modification of our previous argument
that failure of the operative transfer condition implies the existence
of some arbitrarily small, non—neutral deficit policy in which the
government adjusts its bond sales in response to choices of deceased
generations.
We close our discussion of operative transfers with one final
remark. While the issues raised in this section may appear purely
technical, they raise an important empirical issue. Specifically, once
one steps out of Barro's simple framework, it becomes difficult to
determine whether or not any given consumer is up against a binding
constraint, appropriately defined. Certainly, the observation of
positive, discretionary transfers does not constitute sufficient
evidence to establish that two individuals are operatively linked. This
issue must be resolved through more subtle means (see, for example, the
empirical analysis in Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers [1985]).
C. Results
We begin our analysis of government fiscal policy by restricting
attention to equilibria which satisfy a certain strong condition, which
we designate the linkage hypothesis. Formally,
Linkage hypothesis: There exists a set of jointly operative
links X and an integer T such that for each t > 1the following—27—
property holds. For all i,j e there exists a finite integer p
and sequences (i1,... i) and (v1 ,... withi =1





Loosely,this hypothesis implies that in each period t, one can find a
chain of operative linkages connecting any two living individuals, where
each link consists of a transfer madesometimebetween periods t and
t+T.At first, this requirement might appear extremely demanding:
indeed, Barro's dynastic model is based on the seemingly less
restrictive assumption that parents are operatively linked to their
children. However, as we show in Section 4, Barro's assumption
virtually guarantees that the linkage hypothesis will be satisfied. By
invoking this hypothesis, we therefore do nothing more than take the
premises of the dynastic model at face value.
We now demonstrate that, when the linkage hypothesis is satisfied,
sufficiently small but otherwise arbitrary perturbations of government
fiscal poiicy are irrelevant. We define a policy perturbation as
follows. Consider some vector of real numbers 1= (ri2 2)
<,5t >=isan 1)—perturbation of some initial policy
id








for all t, i c and t—histories Ht. Subsequent to the






Proposition: Suppose that some full equilibrium satisfies the
linkage hypothesis. For some 11>0 and every r-perturbation of the
government's fiscal policy, there exists a full equilibrium in which
factor prices, labor supplies, consumption decisions, and purchases of
physical capital are all unaffected. In such an equilibrium, the policy
perturbation simply induces offsetting private transfers and bond
purchases.
We establish this proposition by showing that, subsequent to the
policy perturbation, there must exist an equilibrium for the game
induced by the original profile of factor prices in which consumers
select the same levels of consumption and factor supplies as in the
original full equilibrium, and in which the aggregate demand for—29—
government bonds changes to match supply in every period. The desired
conclusion follows immediately.
We proceed by first considering three simple classes of policy
perturbations, labelled A, B, and C. These provide the building
blocks for analyzing more complex fiscal policies.
Class A: This class of perturbations consists of transfers
between pairs of individuals who are directly linked. That is, we
t
choose some (i,j,t) c L, select .arbitrarily,and set
(Ht) =_(Ht)
3 1
forall Ht. All other aspects of fiscal policy remain unchanged.
To demonstrate the irrelevance of this policy, we consider the




(that is, we adopt a different change of variables in each subgaine).
Clearly, the same numerical choices yield the same payoffs prior to the
perturbation, and in the transformed game after the perturbation.
However, subsequent to the perturbation, the transfer constraint becomes
(Ht) > b(Ht) +(Ht)




t is applied to b... Since i and jareoperatively linked, this
perturbation of the corner constraint will not affect behavior as long
asissufficiently small. But then the policy perturbation is also
irrelevant, in the sense that it only alters i's transfer to j.
Class B: In this class of policy perturbations, the government
issues debt, distributes the proceeds to some individual i, and retires
the debt in the subsequent period by taxing the same individual. That
t t+1 t




for all Ht. All other aspects of fiscal policy remain unchanged.
To demonstrate the irrelevance of this policy, we consider the




Clearly, the same numerical choices yield the same payoffs prior to the
perturbation, and in the transformed game after the perturbation.
Indeed, these two games are strategically equivalent, since there are no
constraints on borrowing or lending. Equilibrium therefore entails the—31—
samenumerical choices. This implies that i simply increases his bond
purchases by 6 (H ).
ClassC:In this class of perturbations, we consider transfers
between pairs of individuals who are alive at the same point in time.
t t That is, we choose 1,3 C I ,select.arbitrarily,and set
(Ht) =._4(Ht)
for all Ht. All other aspects of fiscal policy remain unchanged.
Let i1 ,•.•,ibe the sequence of individuals described in the
















linkk, •tkl )< inax(, )-32—
wheretETEt.
o p4-1
First,we note that the cumulative effect of all these component
policies is equivalent to the effect of the original policy. In
particular, the effect on ik in period 'tklis
0 k=2 ,. . . , p
(H1)+ :1 (H) =
(Ht) k=1




Finally,the change in period'r bond issues is





since T =t 0 p4-i
Now note that for each k, (1) is a Class A policy, arid (2) is a
Class B policy. We know that Class B policies are always irrelevant.
We can therefore focus on the Class A policies. Reasoning as before, we
see that adoption of all the Class A policies described in (1) yields a
game that is equivalent to one which is induced by perturbing the—33-
original transfer constraints as follows: if k' 'k+l c L,
t
k ,'k_titkt H = )a/cx
1k'1k+1 1
otherwise,
'tk k\_ tlt\ t H =—.H )a /a
1k+1,1k
1
Since no link need appear twice in this chain, we can obviously make the
composite perturbation to transfer constraints arbitrarily small by
taking small. Since a small perturbation of transfer constraints
has no effect on behavior, the corresponding policy perturbation mu.st be
irrelevant.
Having analyzed Cases A, B, and C, we are now prepared to consider
t t
an arbitrary policy perturbation, <6 ,(.)?=r
Webegin by
i ci
decomposing this into component parts. For each t, we define
t t N —









Next, define Nt1 policy perturbations as follows. Choose some
i c I, andforall i c 1t_{j*}, let—34-





We now establish that the cumulative effect of these component
policies is equivalent to the effect of the original policy. The effect




Theeffect on 16 I_{i*)is
(Ht) +(Ht)+,(Ht)=(Ht)







where the last equality follows from the government's budget constraint.
Note that for each i 6I—
't—M'
(3) is a Class B policy.
Recall once again that Class B policies are completely irrelevant. We
canthereforeconfine attention to the Class C policies described in
(4).We know that each Class C policy induces a game which, after a—35—
change of variables, is equivalent to one in which we have perturbed
corner constraints. Similarly, the entire policy induces a game which,
after making all component changes in variables, is equivalent to one in
which we have made all component perturbations in the appropriate corner
constraints. We need only verify that the transformed game (i.e., the
one in which variables have been changed) is well-defined, and that the
corresponding aggregate perturbation to corner contraints can be made
arbitrarily small by taking the policy to be small.
Fix some period t, and consider a link, (i,j,t) c L. This link
might appear in any chain connecting any two individuals living in
periods t—T through t. However, it does not appear in any other
chain. The total number of potential appearances is therefore finite
t
(specifically, it is bounded by (i —1)).Consequently,the
'r=t—T
composite change of variables is well—defined. The corresponding total
perturbation- to the link (i,j,t) is just equal to the sum of the
component perturbations. We can clearly make this sum arbitrarily small
t—Tt—T t t
by taking (',..., ii%)sufficientlysmall. Now choose c
such that no c—perturbation to the corner constraints affects
equilibrium behavior. Since there are a finite number of individuals
living in period t, we can find some (t_T, >0
such that for 11 satisfying
(t_T, tT•••1t1.t) < (]tTTt...
theaggregate perturbation to each b, ,impliedby any
1)—perturbation of fiscal policy satisfies—36-
.(Htfl<
13 13
for all Ht aid i,j with (i,j,t) c L. Thus, by choosing r such
that
t t '•'t 't .t
(11 (m1ntT,...t1t},In1n{iiT,...,11})
>0
for all t, we guarantee that the aggregate perturbation to each
b., f3,impliedby any 11—perturbation of fiscal policy satisfies
<
13 13
for all Ht and (i,j,t) c L. The proposition is therefore
established.
One aspect of our proof deserves comment. Note that the number of
potential perturbations to any particular link (which corresponds to the
number of potential appearances of that link in chains connecting pairs
of individuals) rises proportionately with the size of the population.
To keep the potential composite perturbation small, it appears that we
must therefore take each component perturbation smaller and smaller as
the population grows. This observation suggests that, in large
economies, only very tinypolicyperturbations are irrelevant. We
believe, however, that this conclusion is unwarranted. In the proof, we
have fixed the population size, and calculated bounds conservatively by
assuming that every potential appearance of a given link is an actual
appearance. We could obtain tighter bounds by using only actual—37—
appearances,by choosing chains to avoid repeated appearances of any
particular link, and by noting that many perturbations may be partly
offsetting. Indeed, it is conceivable that the number of actual
perturbations of any particular link may not rise with the population
size (see Section 4).
This observation also raises a methodological issue. One can
interpret our result as establishing that fiscal policies have real
effects only when they cause non-negativity constraints to become
relevant (ordinarily, by driving some individual to a corner). Whenever
the dynastic model is employed, one assumes that the validity of the
model's basic premises (including the assumption that particular links
are operative) is robust with respect to an interesting range of
environments (otherwise, the model maybecomeinapplicable if the
environment changes slightly). Government fiscal policy is certainly an
aspect of the environment; indeed, the dynastic model is often used to
compare the effects of alternative policies. If we take the premises of
this framework at face value, we must therefore assume that certain non-
binding corner constraints play no role in determining the effects of a
broad range of fiscal policies. Our analysis then establishes that
these policies are irrelevant.
D. Extensions and Qualifications
In Section 2, we pointed out that changing a price is analogous to
imposing a tax on one party to a transaction, and distributing the
proceeds to the other party. We therefore claimed that, when consumers
are linked through operative transfers, prices are indeterminant (at-38-
least locally), and price changes within the region of indeterminacy
have no effect on the allocation of resources. While this argument may
appear straightforward, it is not strictly correct withinthe context of
the model considered here. Indeed, small changes in prices may well
affect the resulting allocation of resources. However, this occurs only
because consumers and firms exercise peculiar forms of myopia. In both
cases, this myopia is disguised as assumptions about perfect
competition.
Specifically, each consumer trades with the market, rather than
with some set of other consumers. When he contemplates changing his
purchases or sales, he does not realize that this must affect the
purchases or sales of others. If he considers buying more (selling
less), he assumes that the market supplies the incremental goods, and no
one else is affected. Similarly, if he considers buying less (selling
more), the market picks up the residual slack in demand.
Suppose instead that we formulate the process of competitive
exchange as follows. Each consumer takes the market price as fixed, and
announces demand for (supply of) each good. If aggregate supply exceeds
aggregate demand, transactions are rationed to suppliers so that each
supplier sells the same fraction of his announcement. If aggregate
demand exceeds aggregate supply, transactions are rationed so that each
purchaser buys the same fraction of his announcement. Equilibrium
consists of a price and a set of announcements for which aggregate
supply and demand are equal, and no one wishes to alter his
announcement.—39—
Note that on this formulation, each agent believes that he can
effectively buy and sell as much of each good as he likes at the going
price. However, a supplier (similar statements hold for purchasers)
rationally acknowledges that an increase in his sales must either
increase total purchases comensurately (when purchasers are rationed),
or must reduce sales by others commensurately (when suppliers are
rationed). In either case, the impact of his action is divided evenly
between either all purchasers or all suppliers, so that in large
populations, the effect on any given individual is negligible. On this
basis, one typically ignores these effects in competitive models, just
as one ignores budget-balancing distributions of marginal tax revenues
generated by a change in some individual's behavior. Analogously to our
discussion of taxes, this leads one astray under the current set of
assumptions, regardless of population size. For once we have paired
buyers and sellers to form complete transactions, a change in price is
indeed analytically equivalent to a tax levied on one party, and
distributed to the other. Since adoption of this alternative framework
does not alter our central result,J/ both taxes and prices will be
neutral.
The preceding argument applies directly only if both parties to a
transaction are individuals. If one party is a firm, matters are more
complex. Indeed, one might at first think that in this case, prices
must matter. After all, unless prices are chosen to lie on the factor
price frontier (see Diamond [1965]), constant returns—to—scale firms
will either shut down, or attempt to produce infinite quantities of-40-
output. Yet this argument is misleading, since it presupposes that
competitive firms will act as profit maximizing automata. Under our
current set of assumptions, profit maximization is simply not a sensible
objective. Firms ought to be creatures of their owners; they should
attempt to earn profits only if this benefits their owners. A fall in
the price of labor does indeed cause the firm to earn profits. However,
since these profits are distributed to the owners of the firm, the price
change is equivalent to a redistribution between the workers and the
owners. We know that private transfers will offset this
redistribution. It is therefore clear that, nets of these transfers,
the benefit to owners from adjusting production does not vary with the
price of labor.
If prices are irrelevant, then our competitive pricing assumption
is plainly inessential. Even the assumption of price—taking behavior
becomes vacuuous, since one can change the price for any given
transaction without effect. It is therefore not surprising that one can
also introduce market power without altering our central result.
Suppose in addition to a non-monopolized consumption good, c,
there is also a monopolized consumption good, x. The monopolist's price
will, of course, be indeterminant, at least within some range. He will
exercise his market power by deciding who will consume x, and in what
amounts. We can thing of the monopolist as making operative tranfere
of x to others (the recipients of x may in turn pass some of it
on). At the same time, there will be a network of operative transfers
in c. Redistributions of c (x) between people who are operatively—41 -
linkedin c (x) will be irrelevant. If the linkage hypothesis is
satisfied for c, then our central result applies with respect to
redistributions of c. One may even condition such redistributione on
transfers of x (i.e., tax the exercise of market power) without
effect. Thus, if government fiscal policy entails redistribution of
units of account (dollars), the relevant question is whether the linkage
hypothesis is satisfied for units of account. However, even if it is
satisfied, market power will still matter——changing the identity of the
monopolist will necessarily alter the pattern of operative linkages in
x (certainly, the original monopolist will be driven to corners), and
will therefore have real allocative effects.
By now, it should be clear that other restrictive featuresof the
model are not central to our analysis. It is, for example, relatively
easy to disaggregate consumption, capital, and labor. One can thei
establish that excise taxes and various partial factor taxes are
irrelevant. One may also dispense with the assumption of constant
returns—to-scale; we maintained this assumption simply to avoid the
necessity of accounting for distributed profits. Perhaps the most
important restrictions concern uncertainty and information. Our model
describes a deterministic world in which all individuals are perfectly
informed. For the most part, we believe that these restrictions are
also inessential.
First, suppose we introduce uncertainty concerning length of life,
outputs, wages, or gross returns. This would have no effect on our
analysis whatsoever. One could simply view nature as a "player," who—42—
selectscurrent values of these variables according to some random
scheme. One would then include nature's choices in the description of a
t—history, andproceedas before. Insurance effects, such as those
described in Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes [i984], would not materialize,
since interpersonal transfers would neutralize government redistributive
policies for each realization.
Similarremarks apply to uncertainty concerning future government
policy. Even if the government randomizes its actions, individuals may
condition transfers on policy realizations. Thus, each realization
inducesa game which is strategically equivalent to the "no policy" game
with perturbed corner constraints. Clearly, randomization between
equivalent games changes nothing of substance.
Next, suppose individuals have incomplete information about each
other's preferences. Consider, for example, a transfer from individual
A to individual C, where A and C are indirectly linked through B. If C
is uncertain of B's preference, one might think that he would be
reluctant to transfer the entire windfall to B, since he does not know
whether B will choose to pass it on to A, thereby completing the
offset. However, this reasoning is faulty. As long as B and A are
operatively linked, C need not know B's preferences. Certainly,
asymmetric information will affect the nature of equilibrium, but this
was also true in the absence of the transfer policy. For the same
reasons as before, the policy itself does not alter the strategic
environment, except to perturb constraints.
A somewhat more subtle issue concerns information about operative—43—
linkages.The chains which connect different individuals may be
complex; indeed, two individuals may not know how they are connected.
Yet it is not clear that this knowledge is at all essential. As long as
individuals correctly perceive the effects of their own actions on
payoffs, it does not matter if they understand the process which
generates these payoffs. Thus, if we prescribe equilibrium actions
which offset the effects of some transfer policy, individuals will be
willing to abide by these prescriptions. However, this sidesteps a deep
and difficult question: how do individuals arrive at the new
prescriptions? This issue is completely analogous to the observation
that if no single agent knows the "big picture" and coordinates actions,
there is no guarantee that an economy will reach a standard competitive
equilibrium. To resolve this issue, we would require a theory of how
agents achieve equilibria; unfortunately, this important problem is
poorly understood. One could envision an iterative process, wherein
each individual would reactively adjust his transfers, with the property
that stationary points correspond to equilibria. To the extent
individuals acknowledge the irrelevance of fiscal policy, the process of
adjustment following a policy change might actually be very simple: all
agents hold real activities (consumption, production) fixed, and allow
transfers to absorb all residual resources. Finally, if one is
uripersuadedby these arguments and unwilling to dogmatically accept the
implications of equilibrium theory, then one mustalso regard the
dynasticmodel with considerable skepticism. Asweargue inSection 5,
the introduction of myopic concerning patterns of linkages might well-44-
profoundly alter the implications of dynasticisni.
These waters become still murkier if one allows for uncertainty
concerning future linkages (e.g., those arising from marriages formed
after some individual's death). However, we argue in Section 4 that the
linkage hypothesis is likely to be satisfied for small T——one need only
use links spanning a few generations, so that most of these links might
well be known at the relevant point in time. Even when this is not the
case, one can show that the central result continues to hold as long as,
for each pair of individuals, one can devise an algorithm which
describes transfers as a function of realized linkages (e.g.,
marriages), and which connects this pair with probability one. Given
the wide variety of known links available at each point in time, this
condition does not seem very demanding. Of course, the process by which
agents achieve such an equilibrium is again problematic.
Finally, suppose that individuals cannot observe some set of
actions taken by others. Asymmetric information of this sort may
interfere with the neutralization of distortionary taxes. In the proof
of our central result, we transformed variables differently for subgames
differentiated according to prior choices of taxed activities. For this
to be valid, players with transformed actions must be able to
distinguish between these subgames; that is, they must be able to
observe taxed activities. While this requirement is quite demanding, it
may be stronger than is necessary; in some environments, the abilityto
observe a summary statistic, such as government revenue, may suffice.
In anycase,these issues do not bear on the neutrality of arbitrary—45-
lump sum redistributions. Indeed, this weaker form of neutrality does
not even require individuals to observe each other's transfers.i!
4. Interfamily Linkages
The linkage hypothesis may appear excessively demanding. After
all, Barro assumes only that individuals are linked through operative
transfers with their children, while our results require interlinkage of
the entire population. However, we contend that Barro's hypothesis
alone virtually guarantees that our apparently stronger assumption will
be satisfied. Our argument makes explicit reference to the biological
structure of families.
For illustrative purposes, suppose that all individuals marry,
that each marriage produces two children, and that parents are
operatively linked to their children. Then, ignoring redundancies,-i.i
every individual is indirectly linked through common descendents in the
next G generations to
(G) =22i-1
members of its owngeneration.If we assume (as seems natural) that
spouses are operatively linked to each other, then one fewer generation
is required to establish the same links. Accordingly, to appreciate the
importance of links spanning two, three, and four generations, we note
that for G =2,3,and4,(a) is2, 10, and 42, respectively.
This, however, is only the "tip of the iceburg." Once we have
established that one household is connected to another of same-46-
generation, we may extend the chain further by moving up and down the
family tree as many times as desired. Thus, operative linkages form
complex networks, perhaps interconnecting large segments of the
population. Indeed, if each couple is connected to ten others (through
grandchildren), then the probability of finding a "cycle' (a set of
interconnected individuals who are isolated from the rest of the
population) seems quite small.
It is possible to formalize this intuition by appealing to
existing results concerning the theory of random graphs. This requires
some simple preliminaries. A random graph FN is an object
consisting of n nodes and N edges (lines connecting two nodes),
where the edges are selected randomly (all potential edges are equally
probable). In our framework, the nodes would represent distinct couples
belonging to the same generation. An edge represents a linkage between
couples generated by a single movement up and down the tree, spanning at
most G generations. Note that we no longer assume every couple is
operatively linked to two children, and that all children marry——the
number of linkages to a particular couple is random, presumably
reflecting differences in the number of children, whether children
marry, and whether operative links with children exist. On average, we
will assume that couples have two children, so that, as a approximation,
N =
Formally,we may now restate our questions as follows: what is
the probability that FflN is completely connected? What is the
expected size of the greatest connected component of-47-
Unfortunately, these are fabulously complex combinatoric problems
which remain unsolved. There are, however, asymptotic results; for
large populations, we may employ asymptotic approximations.
Specifically, define
N =[—nlogn+ cn] c 2
where c is an arbitrary fixed real number (so
increases slightly faster than linearly in n).
establish that the number of points outside the
component of r is distributed in the limit
n,N
law, with mean value e2c.
To apply this result, we consider a sequence of economies indexed
by n, the number of couples. We fix c at some appropriate level, as
discussed below. For each n, we select G (the maximum allowable
number of generations which a link may span) so that N/n < (G)/2
(note that G will increase extraordinarily slowly with n).J-/Erdcs
and Renyi's theorem then yields lower bounds on the asymptotic
probability of complete linkage, and on the expected size of the largest
connected component. All that remains is to select an appropriate value
for c.
Suppose we wish to obtain asymptotic approximations for a
population of 25 million couples (roughly the size of one "generation"),
where we consider linkages that span three or fewer generations. Then
n =25million, and N =125million. This economy corresponds to an
element of the sequence formed by setting c =3.52.UsingErdos and
that the number of edges
Erd5s and Renyi [1959]
greatest connected
accordin€ to Poisson's-48-
Renyi's result, we see that it would be very unusual to find indirect
linkages between all individuals. However, the expected number of
individuals outside of the greatest connected component is only 1119.
If the asymptotic approximation is accurate, all but a negligable subset
of 25 million couples will be indirectly linked through their
grandchildren.
Table 1 summarizes these calculations, as well as analogous
calculations for G =2and G =4.Surprisingly, even if we restrict
attention to links which span only two generations (parents and
children), on average more than 86% of the population will be indirectly
linked. If we consider links which span as many as four generations,
then it is virtually certain that all couples will be indirectly linked.
Note that the complexity of these networks actually renders
perhaps the majority of interpersonal linkages redundant: typically,
two individuals will be connected through several distinct channels.
Consequently, if for any reason a family's chain of operative linkages
is severed, this does not imply, as in Barro's analysis, that the
neutrality results are inapplicable. Lateral connections between
families will ordinarily suffice to circumvent isolated breaks in any
chain. Thus, the linkage hypothesis is typically satisfied under much
weaker conditions than those imposed by Barro, and our results are
immune to the well—known criticism that Ricardian equivalence holds only
if family chains never break. In addition, other results in the
literature on random graphs (c.f., Bollobas [1981]) suggest that
typically the chains connecting pairs of individuals are surprisingly-49-
short, so that each link may be used relatively few times to offset any
given policy, as claimed in Section 3C.
Finally, we note two important problems which arise concerning our
application of graph theoretic results. First, contrary to our
assumption, not all links are equally probable. Individuals are most
likely to marry others who live in the same geographic areas, and some
communities, such as the Aniish, are almost entirely self—contained.
Intuitively, one would expect this modification to make very little
qualitative difference. Consider, for instance, a society with a
virtually perfect caste system. Suppose that each caste is internally
linked (every member of a caste is linked to every other member). A
single "intermarriage" will the serve to link the entire population. Of
course, in such a society, families might disown the intermarried
couple. Even if they did not, in acting as a conduit for all resource
flows between the two castes, the couple would undoubtably be driven to
corners, which would render their linkages inoperative. However, for
the most part, the "intermarriages" which concern us here would not
violate social customs, and hence generate severence of financial
ties. In addition, the "single intermarriage" case is extreme; we
suspect that links between most large population groups are far more
common (consider, for example, the frequency of racial intermarriages).
Second, contrary to our assumption, links are not distributed
independently. Most importantly, once an individual is linked to
someone, the probability that he is linked to someone else changes. Our
failure to account for this factor is clearly responsible for the-50-
conclusion that all individuals are linked through chains spanning four
generations: the presence of childless individuals renders this
conclusion untenable. However, one might well suppose that, ordinarily,
once an individual is operatively linked to anyone else, he becomes
attached to a much larger network.
In both cases, we may be somewhat more formal about our
intuition. Let AnN be the set of graphs consisting only of one
connected subset, andisolatednodes (points which do not support any
edge).Erd5s and Renyi [1959] demonstrate that the probability of
selecting a graph in A,N goes to one as n goes to infinity. This
is true regardless of c, so we may select c to reflect either the low
probability of interinarriages, or some lower bound on the conditional
probability of additional linkages (in each case understating the true
extent of operative networks). The result suggests that, in general,
anyone who is operatively linked to anyone else will be indirectly
linked to everyone, except for those who are completely isolated.
We close this section with one final thought. In practice, people
are connected through operative transfers not just to children, but also
to siblings, nieces, nephews, cousins, charities, political organiza-
tions, and so forth. Thus, we strongly suspect that, even accounting
for the childless, very few individuals or groups of individuals are
truly isolated in the sense discussed here.—51—
5.Interpretationsand Conclusions
What should one make of the rather perplexing conclusions reached
in Sections 2 through 4? In particular, several points of
interpretation require further discussion. First, what general
principles drive our neutrality results? Second, what does this
analysis teach us about "real" economics? Third, where do we go from
here? We address these questions in subsections A, B, and C,
respectively.
A. Optimality versus Neutrality
At first, one might suspect that our analysis is closely related
to other results which are known to hold under somewhat special
circumstances. Consider, for example, an economy consisting of a single
(a8 opposed to representative) dynastic family, where family members
have dynamically consistent preferences. In this world, every consumer
acts as though he is part of a "big happy family", which maximizes a
single utility function. Clearly, all lump sum transfers are neutral——
the family responds to any such policy by reestablishing its optimum
(indeed, this is the popular intuition for Barro's theorem).
Furthermore, "distortionary" taxes cannot displace the big happy family
from its optimum.
Of course, when one abandons the dynamically consistent formula-
tion of family preferences, one cannot immediately apply the same set of
arguments. However, there is some reason to believe that the same basic
principles may be operative. In particular, Becker [1974] has argued
that, as long as family members are linked through an altruist, each—52—
member acts to maximize family welfare. Although Becker establishes his
result in a rather restrictive environment, one might suspect that, in
some sense, our analysis contains a generalization of this "Rotten Kid
Theorem."
However, this reasoning is simply false, and the conclusions which
follow from it invalid. As discussed in Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers
[1985], Becker's "Rotten Kid Theorem" does not hold when one relaxes his
restrictive assumptions, so the current analysis cannot be founded upon
the "big happy family" view. Accordingly, it is essential to understand
that our results concern neutrality, not optimality. Recall Example 2
of Section 2. There we argued that a labor income tax was neutral,
since it left 1 's effective wage unaltered. We did not, however, assert
that 1chose his labor supply optimally in the initial equilibrium.
Specifically, we did not say that 1 's effective wage was w. Rather, he
faced some shadow wage, which reflected the effect of his labor supply
choices on subsequent transfers. We argued only that this shadow wage
was insensitive to tax and transfer policies. This principle is quite
general: in equilibrium, chosen actions may well be inefficient, but
redistributions contingent upon these choices will not effect behavior.
Aside from delimiting the scope of neutrality, this observation
also implies that our results have no normative implications. Although
all taxes are equivalent to lump sum taxes, lump sum taxation may not be
desirable. Since the equilibrium ordinarily entails preexisting dis-
tortions (due to intrafainily conflict), the government would want to
engage in second—best taxation. However, paradoxically, second—best tax—53-
instrumentsare unavailable. The government can introduce counter-
vailing distortions only by conditioning real expenditures on consumer
behavior.
B. Policy Implications
Our analysis calls into serious question the usefulness of the
dynastic framework as an analytic tool for studying public policy
issues. Unless one is willing to accept untenable conclusions, it is
necessary to abandon some premise central to this framework. One must
therefore regard any conclusions derived from these premises with
considerable skepticism.
Barro's Ricardian equivalence results, which concern the
neutrality of public deficits and social security, are probably the best
known implications that follow from dynastic assumptions. Yet our
criticism also applies to a variety of other studies which adopt Barro's
model. For example, Abel [1984] demonstrates that social security may
have real effects in a dynastic world by inducing redistributions
between families. In light of our analysis, it is clear that, once one
adopts dynastic assumptions, distributional questions are ill—posed.
Judd [1985] and Chamley [1981] study the welfare effects of capital
income taxation in dynastic models. Yet the premises of these models
may imply neutralization of the very distortion which they purport to
study.
A natural response to our criticism is that one ought to view the
dynastic formulation as only an approximation to reality; one should
therefore expect properties such as Ricardian equivalence to hold only—54—
as approximations. Taking the premises of this model literally is
simply unfair, and bound to generate some untenable results.
We find this response completely unsatisfactory. It is clear that
both the degree and nature of the approximation will matter a great
deal. If we agree that taxes, transfers, and prices are not even close
to being irrelevant, then we must also agree that in some important,
policy—relevant sense the world is not even close to being dynastic.
One cannot simply assert that the model holds as a good approximation in
one context, but not in another.It is essential to describe the
approximation explicitly, so that analysts can identify a new set of
assumptions and elucidate their implications.
It may well be that one can modify the dynastic model in a way
which addresses our criticism, while preserving central implications
such as Ricardian equivalence. The first author is pursuing this
possibility in current work with Andrew Abel, but has found the task
quite difficult.
Consider an example. One might argue in defense of Ricardian
equivalence as follows. Our criticism disparages results which depend
on relatively long (although recall our remark in Section 4), indirect
linkages. Individuals may, however, be myopic about effects which work
their way through complex, poorly understood networks, while being
perfectly rational about short, direct chains. Thus, public deficits
redeemed within a few generations may well be approximately irrelevant,
while policies which concern distribution within a generation are not.
Yet a bit of reflection suggests that matters are not nearly so-.55—
simple. To illustrate, consider a world in which each couple has two
children, and all children marry. Suppose for convenience that the
interest rate is zero. The government undertakes a pure Ricardian
exercise, reducing taxes by $10 on each couple today, and increasing
taxes by $10 on each couple belonging to the next generation. What are
the effects of this policy?
Suppose initially that individuals understand the policy, but are
completely myopic about the behavior of others to whom they are only
indirectly linked. An arbitrary couple (A) belonging to the current
generation will then perceive that the wealth of its family has fallen
by $10——while it receives $10, each child loses $10. Consequently, the
deficit policy will have substantial real effects.
For Ricardian equivalence to hold, couple A must understand that
it is indirectly linked to two other sets of parents (B and c). Even
if A understands this, it must be fairly sophisticated about
coordinating actions with the other parents. There are an infinite
number of ways to offset this policy——each couple could give $5toeach
child, $10 to one child and nothing to the other, or, more generally, $x
to one child and $10—i to the other. Further, when A worries about
coordinating actions with B and C, it must consider the fact that B and
C face similar problems with two other couples, D and B. If B fails to
coordinate properly with D, then B will in general not wish to join A in
offsetting the policy for their married children, as described above.
Effectively, A must believe that everyone is coordinating actions
through the entire web of linkages, and that this is common knowledge.—56—
Thus, when families are interlinked, Ricardian equivalence does not
appear to demand a lower level of rationality than do our results.
C. Where Next?
Our arguments depend most heavily upon several central
assumptions. First, we assume that operative linkages are quite
common. Second, we assume that individuals care only about the
consequences of giving, and not directly about the amount given. To
establish the irrelevance of all fiscal policies and prices, we must
also assume that actions are publicly observable. If one relaxes this
last assumption and supposes instead that capital markets are perfect,
it is then possible to demonstrate that all lump sum redistributions are
irrelevant. In order to conduct constructive policy analyses, one must
modify one or more of these basic premises. We consider them in reverse
order.
The last two assumptions are certainly objectionable on empirical
grounds. However, this does not fully account for our skepticism
concerning the model's implications. Suppose hypothetically that the
government adopted and effectively enforced (through enormous penalties)
a new law requiring public disclosure of all private financial
decisions. We would not expect fiscal policy and prices to become
irrelevant as a consequence. We conclude that an important source of
our disbelief must lie elsewhere.
The second assumption might fail for several reasons. Generosity
may be inherently fulfilling. Alternatively, individuals might be
myopic with respect to the actions of their heirs, and simply take the-57-
sizeof transfers as a proxy for well—being. Both views are somewhat
appealing, but neither leads to a satisfactory theory of transfers. For
example, it is difficult to know why an individual would care about the
magnitude of his transfer if it truly did not affect any real outcome.
In both cases, the specification of the transfer motive is necessarily
ad hoc.
Violations of the first assumption fall into two categories:
either a large number of people fail to make positive transfers, or
corners matter despite the fact that transfers are positive. Many
commentators have indeed claimed that corner constraints bind for most
individuals. Barro [1984] offers a theoretical reason for expecting
this outcome, but does not elucidate implications for policy. Our
analysis suggests a somewhat different reason, which raises some
intriguing possibilities.
To illustrate, consider a world in which there are three
successive generations (t =1,2,3),each consisting of N households.
For purposes of interpretation, one should think of each household as a
married couple. Each member of generation t =1,2 has two children,
but, of course, children are shared (a child—household is formed by the
marriage of two individuals who come from two different parent house-
holds). Suppose that the children of the i-th household in generation 1
belong to the m(i)—th and f(i)—th households in generation 2 (where
these indices are assigned so that everyone in generation 2 has two
forebearers in generation i). Further suppose that the children of
the i—th household in generation 2 belong to the i—th and 1—th-58-
householdsin generation 3 (with the exception that N's children belong
to the N—th and first households). We select this stylized pattern of
linkages in order to guarantee that there is a chain that interconnects
the entire population.
We will assume that all households are identical within
generations.Theutility of household un generation t is given by
u(c)+k(u2 +u2 ) t1
1 f(i)m(i)
t 2 3 3
u.= u(c.)+k(u.+u.) t=2
1 3. 1 1+1
u(c) t3
Thisindividual is endowed with initial wealth, w.
Behavior unfolds as follows. First, each member of generation 1
chooses its own consumption, and transfers to its children. Next, each
member of generation 2 does the same. Finally, members of generation 3
consumer their endowments, plus all transfers received.
Suppose that along some symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
path, all members of generation 2 make operative transfers to their
children.J-V The analysis of Section 3 then establishes that the
consumption of any household in either generation 2 or 3 depends only
uponthetotal resources available to all members of those
generations. If N is large, then the marginal propensity to consume
from wealth for any given individual must be close to zero (this point
is analogous to Sugden's [1982] observation concerning the provision of
charity). Thus, each member of generation 1 knows that his gifts will—59-
have a negligible impact upon the consumption of his descendents. In
contrast, gifts involve a non-negligible sacrifice of his own
consumption. Thus, under relatively weak conditions, no member of
generation 1 will make an operative transfer.
The main point raised by this discussion is that in large
populations where preferences are dynastic and decisions are sequential,
large numbers of individuals must end up at corners. In addition, the
particular model considered here produces endogenous cycles: one
generation acts altruistically, making transfers to its children, while
the next generation, despite being identical to the first, acts
selfishly (this remains true as one adds generations). While we do not
seriously propose this particular pattern as descriptive of the real
world, our analysis does suggest that endogenous behavior may well give
rise to patterns of operative linkages that do not generate standard
dynastic results, such as Ricardian equivalence.
While there are both empirical and theoretical reasons for
doubting that most individuals make positive transfers, we are unable to
fully attribute our disbelief to this assumption. We suspect that, the
thrill of victory aside, most individuals would prefer winning $1,000 in
a lottery, to learning that one of their siblings has won $1,000,
despite the expectation of future transfers from the parent. Yet
dynasticism implies that one should be indifferent.
We are therefore led to reexamine the other aspect of our first
assumption: corners matter, even though they do not bind, in the
traditional sense. So far as we know, the only fully elaborated—60-
theories which are compatible with this view envision transfers as a
means of facilitating exchange within families (see, for example,
Kotlikoff andSpivak[1981], andBernheim,Shleifer, andSummers
[1985]).Accordingly, we believe that subsequent policy analyses should
consider more carefully the implications of non-standard alternatives to
the dynastic transfer motive.—61 —
Footnotes
Overlapping generations models are not only generally less
tractable, but also often give rise to equilibria with undesirable
properties. Specifically, equilibria in overlapping generations
models may fail to be either efficient or locally unique (see
Balasko and Shell [1980] and Kehoe and Levine [1985]). Failure of
local uniqueness is particularly troubling in any exercise
involving comparative statics or dynamics. Thus, Judd [1985]
unabashedly attributes his adoption of the dynastic framework to
analytic convenience. Unfortunately, this advantage may be
illusory. In a recent paper, Gale 1985] has pointed out that,
while Barro's dynastic solution is an equilibrium for the model
which he considers, this model also generally gives rise to a
continuum of subgame perfect intergenerational equilibria (see
Selten [1965, 1975]), many of which are inefficient. By adopting
dynastic assumptions, one therefore does not necessarily succeed
in avoiding the problems which arise in the standard overlapping
generations framework.
Barro [1974, p. 1097] explains that "current generations act
effectively as though they were infinite—lived when they are
connected to future generations by a chain of operative
intergenerational transfers." Subsequent papers reinforced the
notion that Ricardian equivalence is somehow tied to the
dynamically consistent formulation of family preferences; see, for
example, Buiter and Carmichael's [1984] dispute with Burbidge
[1983, 1984].
Equilibria are quite generally inefficient in models with
interlocking families. One important reason has been emphasized
by Nerlove, Razin, and Sadka [1984]: when unrelated individuals
share a common descendent, the consumption of that descendent is a
public good.
In fact, one can think of agent 3 as a public project financed by
voluntary contributions, in which case the analysis of Bergstrom,
Blume and Varian [1984] establishes the neutrality result. We are
aware that Lawrence Kotlikoff also derived this result indepen-
dently. These authors did not, however, note the strategic
equivalence of the pre- and post—transfer games (which makes the
result substantially more general), nor did they discover the
neutrality of so—called "distortionary" taxes (and the
implications, discussed in Section 5, for the role of prices in
resource allocation). In addition, the framework employed by
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian is substantially more restrictive
than the general model considered in Section 3 (their neutrality
result was established for networks of interpersonal 1inkaes with
a very specific structure). We also note that CarmichaelL1982]—62—
had previously recognized that the key to Barro's theorem
concerned the preservation of opportunity sets, rather than the
specification of altruism.
In this example, equilibria are generally inefficient due to the
public good problem noted in Footnote 2.
Two games are strategically equivalent if they have the same
extensive forms.
1/ Ourcentral result depends critically on the assumption that
strategically equivalent games yield equivalent equilibria.
Essentially, this implies that we can think entirely in terms of
abstract actions, ignoring the primitive actions to which these
actually correspond. Yet in many situations, primitive actions
may play a role in determining behavior. The most obvious role
arises when the game yields multiple equilibria—-players may
gravitate toward equilibria in which their choices are close to
certain focal alternatives (e.g., zero transfers, or transfers
prior to the policy perturbation). It is, however, difficult to
see how this possibility could invalidate our result without
simultaneously rendering the dynastic framework inapplicable.
Indeed, the purpose of many refinements is to rule out equilibria
which are sensitive to perturbations in either the environment or
in the rules governing behavior (see Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine
[1986]).
.2_I Ofcourse, if 2 must hurt himself to carry out this threat, 1
might choose to call 2's "bluff"-—accordingly, these equilibria
are not subgame perfect.
19_IDetailsof such calculations are available from the authors upon
request. The reader may also wish to consult Bernheim (1986).
One could also allow consumers to lock in transfers for a number
of years, including transfers to unborn generations. This would
change nothing of substance.
Note that we do not allow z to depend upon current (period t)
choices. Effectively, the gverninent collects tax revenues at the
"end" of each time period (in the last period of life, revenues
must be collected from the individual's estate, or equivalently,
from his heirs). This aspect of our model is an artifact of
discrete time——we model the government policy in this way so that
private and public transfers are on an equal footing (within a
single period, both may be conditioned on the same behavior).—63—
There is, for example, a growing literature which analyses models
in which each generation cares about its own consumption, and the
consumption of its successor (see, e.g., Arrow [1973], Dasgupta
[1974a,bJ, Kohlberg [1976], Lane and Mitra [1981], Bernheim and
Ray [1983,1986], and Leininger [1986]). Bernheim and Ray [1983]
and Leininger L1986] established existence of Nash equilibria in
the class of continuous consumption functions which are upper
semicontinuous from the left, with limits from the right. Despite
the simplicity of these models, there are no known conditions
which guarantee that these functions will be either continuous or
concave in any reasonably general set of environments. In fact,
Kohlberg [1976] has shown that Nash equilibria in continuously
differentiable strategies do not generally exist.
The reader may verify this through a slight modification of the
argument used in Section 3C.
In example 1, we have assumed that 1 and 2 select transfers
simultaneously. This is equivalent to letting 1 choose first, and
assuming that 2 then selects a transfer without having observed
l's choice.
e.g. the possibility that siblings have different in—laws. For
large populations and small values of G, this is presumably an
excellent approximation.
illEachedge represents a link for two couples; hence we divide the
number of links by two to obtain the number of edges.
In particular, for the values of c considered here, it is not
necessary to consider linkages which span more than four
generations until the population size exceeds 1015.
.i11Onecan derive relatively weak conditions under which this occurs.-64-
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Table 1
Asymptotic Approximations for the Distribution of Linked Subsets
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